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5 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Director of Central Intelligence
Sensitive Compartmented Information
Security Policy []

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1. [] As a result of my review of the Boyce/Lee case, I am directing a number of actions affecting the security of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) programs and products. These will impact on various components of the Intelligence Community. Set forth below are specific actions which I am directing that you take within your area of responsibility.

2. [] Through the Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), stabilize the current (as of 1 June 1977) levels of COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE system access approvals until 1 December 1977. For each person who is indoctrinated for access to material controlled in one of these systems, another person must be removed from access to the same system. I shall expect the number of persons holding such access approvals to be reduced during this freeze period and would like status reports on the progress of these efforts on 1 September and 1 December 1977. Any access approvals which will not be offset by commensurate debriefings will be channeled through the Senior Intelligence Officer of the agency involved and the chairman of the appropriate committee and will be subject to my final approval.

3. [] Task the Security Committee to:

a. Re-examine Community-wide adherence to DCID No. 1/14 and report to me on: (1) whether its

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investigative standards are being met; (2) whether the minimum standards may be considered high enough to ensure comparability of SCI screening among agencies; and (3) whether its standards should be revised upward.

b. Develop an appropriate procedure for the exchange of information within the Community on SCI disapprovals to ensure that significant derogatory information used as a basis for denying SCI access by one agency is available to any other agency also considering granting such access to the individual. The objective is to formulate a legal, workable process to ensure that all derogatory information is considered in adjudicating any request for a SCI access approval and in reviewing cases of continuing access.

4. [] Task the Chairman, COMIREX to take steps to discontinue the [] access approval. Individuals now holding [] approvals may be indoctrinated for TALENT-KEYHOLE access where necessary, with such individuals receiving indoctrination only to the extent needed to protect the TALENT-KEYHOLE information they may receive. Within government, communicators requiring access to [] information should be processed for [] access approvals. In industry, appropriate project access approvals should be requested. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office, is being tasked to discontinue the use of [] outside of government and to review its use within government with a view to reduction. I shall expect a report on the progress of this effort on 1 December 1977.

5. [] I intend to promote better management information about SCI security systems by enhancing the SPECLE II computerized data base. Better visibility is needed of the growth patterns of the various compartments. Periodic reports are needed on the numbers and categories of personnel holding the various SCI access approvals to provide a basis for analysis and control. I would like responses from COMIREX and SIGINT Committees by ~~30~~ July 1977 ^{5/ST} regarding their perceptions of the format and content that such reports should feature. The Director, National Reconnaissance Office is being similarly tasked. In this same vein, since it is intended that the computerized

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data base maintained by the Compartmented Information Branch of CIA's Office of Security serve as the central record for all SCI access approvals, planning should begin now for the input of data on special intelligence approvals by all NFIB member agencies.

25X1 6. [] Task the Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX to determine what materials and information now controlled in the COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE systems respectively may be decompartmented and to estimate the number of access holders who could be debriefed if such decompartmentation were to be effected.

25X1 7. [] Task the Chairmen of the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX to levy upon each Executive Branch agency with SCI approved personnel to carefully review its requirements for SCI material in comparison with the number of access holders to determine whether a reduction can be effected. I expect a report within 90 days on the extent of the reduction.

/s/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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